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Financial liberalization may have a positive effect on 
growth not only through the increase in the quantity 
of the available funds, but also through a more efficient 
allocation of resources across firms and sectors. Despite 
this intuitive appeal, there is little empirical evidence 
on the positive effect of financial liberalization on 
capital allocation. The main difficulty of investigating 
the linkage between liberalization of financial markets 
and capital allocation efficiency lies in the fact that the 
efficiency of capital allocation is not directly observable. 
One way to address this issue is to evaluate the effect 
of financial liberalization within the Heckscher-
Ohlin framework. Producing and exporting products 
inconsistent with a country's factor endowments 
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constitutes a serious misallocation of the funds, which 
undermines competitiveness of the economy and inhibits 
its long run growth. This paper tests the allocative 
efficiency hypothesis by evaluating the effect of stock 
market liberalization on the survival of different product 
categories using export data for 91 countries over the 
period of 1975–2003. Preliminary results suggest that 
after liberalization of the domestic stock market, products 
employing intensively scarce factors exit at a relatively 
higher rate from a country's export portfolio. In other 
words, following liberalization episodes, a country 
tends to rebalance its export portfolio towards products 
consistent with its factor's endowments.Financial Liberalization and Allocative E¢ ciency of
Capital￿
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11 Introduction
Academic economists and practitioners have long debated over the e⁄ects of ￿nancial lib-
eralization on growth. Many question its usefulness for developing countries, where it is
associated with large macroeconomic ￿ uctuations, ￿nancial bubbles, banking crises and deep
economic recessions (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Bhagwhati, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz,
2000, 2002). Others point out its bene￿cial e⁄ect on output growth, investment and quality
of institutions (Levchenko et al., 2009; Gupta et al., 2009; Quinn and Toyoda, 2009; Bekaert
et al., 2005). Yet, the cost of capital and associated growth in investment following ￿nancial
liberalization appears rather modest in comparison to the large GDP growth e⁄ect (Bekaert
and Harvey, 2005; Henry, 2000, 2003). Therefore, ￿nancial liberalization may have a positive
impact on growth through its e⁄ect on the e¢ ciency of allocation of resources in an economy
(quality e⁄ect), rather than through the quantity of mobilized capital (quantity e⁄ect).
The main di¢ culty in empirically testing this hypothesis lies in the fact that allocation
e¢ ciency is not directly observable. Many empirical studies test the allocation e¢ ciency hy-
pothesis of ￿nancial liberalization by analyzing the behavior (variance) of the marginal rate
of capital or Tobin￿ s q around liberalization episodes. Chari and Henry (2003) analyze the
behavior of prices and investment around the liberalization episodes. They ￿nd that ￿rms
experience a signi￿cant increase in both investment and Tobin￿ s q shortly after stock mar-
ket liberalization. Abiad et al. (2007) look at the dispersion of expected marginal returns
to capital before and after ￿nancial liberalization. They ￿nd that ￿nancial liberalization
decreases the variability of the marginal return of capital supporting the view that ￿nan-
cial liberalization facilitates the equalization of the marginal return of capital across sectors
and, therefore, promotes more e¢ cient allocation of funds. Using ￿rm level data for twelve
developing countries, Galindo et al. (2005) construct a summary index of the e¢ ciency
of investment allocation. They show that following ￿nancial liberalization the investment
allocation e¢ ciency index increases suggesting that the link between investment and ￿rms
fundamentals become stronger following ￿nancial liberalization. Other studies attempt to
test the allocative e¢ ciency hypothesis by looking at the rise in investment ￿ ows to individ-
ual ￿rms after ￿nancial liberalization. The increase in investment ￿ ow to more productive
￿rms (with highest total factor productivity) following ￿nancial liberalization is interpreted
as an improvement in allocation e¢ ciency. (Jaramillo et al., 1992; Siregar, 1992)
This paper is a ￿rst attempt to analyze the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization on the allo-
cation of resources in the economy using trade theory perspective. A country should trade
according to its comparative advantage which may be de￿ned either in terms of its factor
endowments (Heckscher-Ohlin) or in terms of its relative labor productivity. Export pattern
not consistent with the comparative advantage is a sign of resource misallocation in the econ-
omy. In this empirical investigation, I rely on the Heckscher-Ohlin framework which states
that a country should export products that use abundant factors in their production and
import products that use scarce factors.1 Indeed, the sectors that rely on the scarce factors
of the economy are the less e¢ cient ones, because they have higher costs of production and
lower export growth opportunities. However, these predictions may not hold in the presence
of market frictions. Weak property right protection, agency problem, asymmetric informa-
tion or active industrial policy pursued by the government alter the borrowing constraints of
1There are several reasons behind this choice. First of all, there is no productivity data available at the
product level, which prevents me to account for Ricardian comparative advantage in my empirical analysis.
Second, it is shown that the Ricardian and the HO models are empirically separable and that ignoring the
Ricardian terms of comparative advantage does not bias the results of the empirical test of the HO model.
Finally, the HO comparative advantage model seems to empirically outperform the Ricardian model (Morrow,
2008).
2industries. As a consequence, the di⁄erence in borrowing constraints across industries shapes
the sectoral composition of a country￿ s exports making it di⁄erent from the "e¢ cient" one.
This misallocation of funds across sectors inhibits growth and undermines the competitiveness
of the economy in the long run. Theoretically, ￿nancial liberalization may improve e¢ ciency
of domestic ￿nancial intermediaries and have bene￿cial e⁄ects on allocation of investment in
an economy by increasing competition in the domestic ￿nancial markets. I empirically test
this hypothesis by looking at the entry and exit dynamics of di⁄erent products in the country
export portfolio before and after ￿nancial liberalization.
My results suggest that the products that lie far from the country￿ s comparative advantage
set have a relatively higher exit rate following the liberalization of ￿nancial markets. In other
words, ￿nancial liberalization tends to rebalance the composition of the country￿ s export
portfolio towards the products that use intensively the economy￿ s abundant factors.
This paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, it contributes to the empirical
literature which analyzes the e⁄ect of capital account or equity market liberalization on re-
source allocation in an economy. Most of these empirical studies test the allocation e¢ ciency
hypothesis of ￿nancial liberalization indirectly by looking at the behavior (variance) of the
marginal rate of capital or Tobin￿ s q around liberalization episodes (Chari and Henry, 2003;
Abiad et al., 2007; Galindo et al., 2005). This study takes a di⁄erent approach by testing the
allocation e¢ ciency through the analysis of the country￿ s exporting patterns following ￿nan-
cial liberalization. In this context, allocation e¢ ciency implies the alignment of a country￿ s
exporting pattern with its factor endowments.
Second, it contributes to papers studying the link between ￿nancial development and
export performance. Manova (2008) and Iacovone and Zavacka (2009) show that shocks
in the supply of loanable funds have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the export performance of the
sectors depending on external ￿nancing. Beck (2003) and Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005) ￿nd
that ￿nancially developed countries tend to specialize in sectors relying intensively on external
￿nancing. This paper investigates a di⁄erent channel through which ￿nancial liberalization
may improve a country￿ s export performance by examining the role of ￿nancial liberalization
in preventing ine¢ cient exporting patterns.
Finally, this paper shares important similarities with studies analyzing the allocative
function of ￿nancial markets. Wurgler (2000) shows that the rate of investment growth is
closely associated with contemporaneous value added growth in countries characterized by
strong developed ￿nancial markets, suggesting that ￿nancially developed countries invest
more in fast- growing industries and invest less in declining industries. Black and Strahan
(2002), Cetorelli and Strahan (2004), Betrand et al. (2007) study the allocative e¢ ciency
within the context of domestic banking deregulation. They show that the banking reforms
are associated with new ￿rm creation, reduction in the level of product market concentration
and improvement in the allocation of assets and jobs across ￿rms.
Based on the portfolio theory, Acarya et al. (2008) show that inter- and intra-states
branch liberalization spur the reallocation of capital within the states according to the mean
variance e¢ ciency. Jaud et al. (2010) ￿nd that countries with more developed banking
sectors tend to export products consistent with their comparative advantages. In particular,
using the Cox Proportional Hazard framework (Cox 1972), they show that products relying
intensively on scarce factors tend to have a shorter export life than products relying on
abundant factors in countries with better developed banking system. While this paper uses
a similar framework as Jaud et al. (2010), it extends the former in several dimensions.
First, I investigate a di⁄erent hypothesis. Financial liberalization is a process of elimination
of various restrictions on ￿nancial markets such as the removal of credit controls, interest
rate controls, bank entry barriers or restrictions on international ￿nancial transactions. It is
associated with a reduction of the role of government and an increase in the role of market
3in allocation of credit. Financial liberalization a⁄ects the incentives with which credit is
allocated by bringing more freedom to agents in making ￿nancial decisions. While most
scholars agree that more developed ￿nancial markets promote an e¢ cient allocation of funds
across sectors and ￿rms, there is much less consensus about the bene￿cial e⁄ect of ￿nancial
liberalization on allocative e¢ ciency. In fact, deregulation of ￿nancial markets in some
Asian and Latin America countries is accompanied by large macroeconomic ￿ uctuations
and banking crises. Several studies point out that ￿nancial liberalization, in the presence of
overall market imperfections, may increase capital misallocation in the economy by triggering
speculative behavior of ￿nancial intermediaries (Allen and Gale, 2000; Schneider and Tornell,
2004; Tresell and Verdier, 2007). Second, for the purpose of my analysis I use a di⁄erent
database which is based on more aggregated data from the COMTRADE database (SITC
4 and 5 digits) covering longer time period, 1975-2003. Third, I verify my hypothesis using
an alternative estimation procedure by analyzing the e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization on the
probability of entry and exit using ￿xed e⁄ect logit regression. In addition, I estimate the
e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization on the overall distance of the country￿ s export to comparative
advantage. This allows me to identify the aggregate e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization on
the country￿ s export pattern. Finally, I investigate the channels through which ￿nancial
liberalization may promote more e¢ cient allocation of resources in the economy.
In my analysis, I focus on external capital account liberalization and primarily on stock
market liberalization. My choice is mostly dictated by the data availability. The data on
domestic ￿nancial liberalization (domestic bank liberalization) is scarce and fragmented. I
rely primarily on stock market liberalization for several reasons. First, while broad indices
of ￿nancial liberalization show little time variation, stock market liberalization constitutes
a radical shift in the degree of capital account openness, which provides su¢ cient variation
to identify its e⁄ect. Second, broad indices comprise various aspects of capital account
liberalizations. When they change, it is not clear which of the many possible restrictions are
eliminated. Therefore, looking at one aspect of ￿nancial liberalization allows me to better
identify causal links. Third, there is a clear theoretical prediction concerning the e⁄ect of
stock market liberalization on the cost of capital and investment in the liberalizing countries.
Finally, the timing of stock market liberalization coincides with a period of net capital in￿ ows
for most developing countries. With the sole exception of Malaysia, there was no reversal of
freedom of foreign access after stock market liberalization (Henry, 2003). Therefore, stock
market liberalization signi￿es the beginning of a steady move toward greater freedom of
capital in￿ ows.
I ￿nd that opening equity markets is associated with a longer survival of all products.
However, products that lie far from the country￿ s comparative advantage have a relatively
higher hazard rate after market equity liberalization. These results are obtained with country,
year and product ￿xed e⁄ects, which account for systematic di⁄erences across countries and
products and capture general time trends. I show that my results are not driven by cross
sectoral di⁄erences between countries with open and closed markets by running separate
regression on the sample of 39 economies which liberalized foreign portfolio ￿ ows during the
sample period. Since capital account liberalizations can be part of broader reform programs,
I show that the results are not driven by simultaneous changes in trade policy by including
a trade liberalization dummy in the set of controls. The results remain unchanged when I
control alternatively for trade openness.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides some
intuition for the empirical ￿ndings. Section two presents the methodology and the data.
Section 3 reports the estimation results and provides some evidence on a transmission channel.
The last section concludes.
41.1 Financial Liberalization and Allocative E¢ ciency: A Transmis-
sion Mechanism.
Financial liberalization is strongly associated with an increase in the role of market and a
reduction in the role of government in allocation of credit. Therefore, ￿nancial liberalization
a⁄ects the incentives with which capital is allocated across sectors and ￿rms. Free access to
international capital markets increases competition in the domestic ￿nancial markets. The
presence of foreign investors can improve equity market liquidity and price e¢ ciency (Bekaert
et al., 2009) which will result in more e¢ cient allocation of funds at least for the listed
companies. Financial liberalization may have a bene￿cial e⁄ect on the e¢ ciency of domestic
banking sector. Competition pushes banks to lend money to young and relatively riskier ￿rms.
Screening of customers becomes more important as the return to screening rises. Stricter
bank lending forces underperforming ￿rms to shut down, encouraging at the same time the
entries of new ￿rms. Banks, ceteris paribus, tend to focus on ￿rms operating in comparative-
advantage sectors because they are better risks.2 As argued by Amity and Weinstein (2009),
international trade is an activity particularly dependent on ￿nancing, among other things,
due to the delays involved in the transactions. Thus, ￿rms in comparative-disadvantage
sectors ￿nding it harder to ￿nance their entry into or survival in export markets either exit
or refrain from entering export markets. On aggregate, one should therefore expect to see
less entry, more exit, and relatively shorter survival on export markets in those sectors after
￿nancial liberalization.
Financial liberalization may improve the quality of domestic legal institutions. Foreign
investors might require better corporate governance and regulatory oversight. Improvement
in contract enforcement and transparency foster further entries and competition in the bank-
ing sector, reinforcing the initial e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization on ￿nancial markets. Finally,
￿nancial liberalization limits a government￿ s power to provide large subsidized loans to "fa-
vored" ￿rms. Domestic ￿nancial institutions facing competition from international players
become reluctant to extend credit to ine¢ cient producers. Mobile capital forces the gov-
ernment to maintain macro-economic prudence, further reducing the government￿ s ability
to intervene in the domestic credit market. As a consequence, the politically linked ￿rms,
which enjoyed subsidized loans prior to liberalization, face higher borrowing costs and tighter
competition afterwards. This, in turn, spurs further restructuring activities and reallocation
of capital across and within sectors (Loriaux, 1997, Rajan and Zingales, 2003).3
2 Estimation
In this section I discuss the estimation strategy and brie￿ y describe the data used for the
analysis. My main hypothesis is that following liberalization episodes, products employing
intensively scarce factors exit at a relatively higher rate from a country￿ s export portfolio4.
In other words, a country tends to rebalance its export portfolio towards products consistent
with its comparative advantage. I test this hypothesis by estimating the Cox Proportional
Hazard model recently applied in the empirical trade literature.5 I verify my results looking
2Firms operating in comparative-advantage sectors may have lower production costs and better growth
opportunities in international product markets.
3The historical study of Haber (1997) provides a useful illustration of the e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization
on the dynamics and structure of the textile industry in Brazil and Mexico. Following its political revolution,
Brazil liberalized its ￿nancial markets while the ￿nancial sector in Mexico remained completely oppressed.
Starting relatively smaller and more concentrated, the textile industry in Brazil grew faster and became more
competitive than the Mexican textile industry.
4The di⁄erence between exit rates of the products increases following ￿nancial liberalization.
5See Appendix A for details on the methodology.
5at the probability of exits and entries using ￿xed e⁄ect logit regression.
2.1 Data description
I use export data from the UN Comtrade database. The data is reported at 4 or 5 digits of
SITC product classi￿cation which comprises around 1160 di⁄erent product categories for 233
countries over the period 1975-2003. I reconstruct the database keeping only the information
about the starting and ending year of a trade relationship, dropping continuous years of
exporting between these two dates.6
I construct several spell characteristics using original export data. I compute the total
number of products supplied by the country, the total number of exporters of the product,
the initial transaction value and the number of years of exporting before the current spell,
which accounts for previous experience of the country in supplying the product to the World.
These variables account for the country￿ s export diversi￿cation, the product market size and
the overall export performance of the country, respectively. According to the literature on
trade survival, these variables increase the probability of survival of trade relationships.
Data on equity market liberalization comes from the database of Bekaert et al. (2005).
The data on equity market liberalization covers 91 countries between 1980 and 2000. It
includes 41 countries that liberalized their stock market during the period between 1980 and
2000, 16 countries that liberalized their stock market prior to 1980, and 34 countries that did
not remove the stock market restriction during the period under consideration.7 Bekaert et al.
(2005) report both the o¢ cial year of equity market liberalization and the intensity of equity
market liberalization, which represents a proportion of the portfolio of domestic equities that
are available to foreign investors. A ratio of one means that the whole domestic equity is
available to foreign investors. I construct 3 proxies for equity market liberalization. First,
I construct an o¢ cial liberalization dummy equal to 1 in the year of o¢ cial liberalization
and afterwards (Lib1). Second, I construct a liberalization intensity dummy, which is set to
the intensity level in the year of liberalization and afterwards (Lib2). Finally, I construct
a third proxy for equity market liberalization using the speci￿c structure of the data. It
takes the value 0 if equity market liberalization happens after the end of spell, 1 if ￿nancial
liberalization takes place during the life of the spell and 2 if ￿nancial liberalization occurs
before the beginning of the spell. All proxies are equal to zero for the countries that have
never liberalized their equity markets. They take the value 1 or 2 for the countries that
liberalized their ￿nancial markets prior to 1980 (Lib3).
To check the robustness of my results, I employ two de facto measures of ￿nancial lib-
eralization. I use the capital account openness constructed by Quinn and Toyoda (2008).
The capital account openness varies from 0 to 4, with 4 indicating a fully open economy.
The measure is available for 94 countries in the world over the period 1950-2004. In addi-
tion, I use the de facto measure of ￿nancial openness proposed by Lane and Millesi-Ferretti
(2006), which is de￿ned as the ratio of total foreign assets and liabilities over GDP. The
authors estimate external assets and liabilities for 145 industrial and developing countries
using the international-investment-position ￿gures published by national central banks and
governments.
The data on the product revealed factor intensity and the country￿ s factor endowments
are taken from the database of Cadot et al. (2009). The factor intensities for product k are
calculated as the weighted average of the factor endowments of the countries exporting this
6To correct for left censoring observations and to account for recent exporting experience, which I de￿ne
as length of the previous spells ended less than 5 years before beginning of the current spell (tot_y_exp), I
drop all spells observed before1975, so my survival database started e⁄ectively in 1975
7See Appendix C for the country coverage.












The revealed human-capital intensity of product k and revealed land intensity are calculated
in a similar way.
The data on ￿nancial development is taken from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine￿ s
(2009) database, which contains various indicators of ￿nancial development across countries
and over time. The annual data for GDP per capita (GDPpc) is taken from the World
Development Indicator report 2006, and is reported in constant 2000 US dollars. The data
on trade liberalization episodes is taken from Wacziarg and Welch (2008), while the trade
openness variable is taken from the Penn World Tables. The data for banking and currency
crisis are taken from the systemic banking database of Laeven and Valencia (2008).The
database covers all systemically important banking and currency crises for the period 1970
to 2007.8
2.2 Estimation strategy
According to my main hypothesis, ￿nancial liberalization should have a di⁄erentiated e⁄ect on
survival of di⁄erent product categories. Products relying intensively on scarce factors should
disappear at a faster rate from a country￿ s export portfolio. Therefore, the interaction term
of the liberalization dummy and the product￿ s distance to the comparative advantage set
should be positive and signi￿cant in a Cox Proportional Hazard speci￿cation. I distinguish
products using two metrics of distance. The ￿rst one is the Euclidian distance between the
vector of the country￿ s endowments and the vector of the product revealed factor intensity
(Cadot et al., 2009). The second is a sum of absolute di⁄erences between the country￿ s factor
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where hc ; kc, and lc are the country￿ s human-capital, capital and land endowments, and ^ hk;
^ ￿k, ^ lk are the revealed factor intensities of product k. I standardized the absolute di⁄erences
between the product factor intensities and the country￿ s factor endowments to have zero
mean and unit variance. I allow the shape of the baseline hazard function h0(t) to vary across
products, by ￿tting a strati￿ed Cox Proportional Hazard model with the SITC product code
as a strati￿cation variable. Strati￿cation by the SITC adds more ￿ exibility to the model and
allows to estimate the e⁄ect of the Xck on the hazard rate within-product9. Therefore, the
main speci￿cation is given by:
hj(tjXck) = h0k(t)(exp￿:(Fin_Libct0￿distanceckt) + ::::
8See Appendix D for the description of the variables used in estimation.
9Allowing baseline hazard to vary across products can be viewed as a more general way of accounting for
time-invariant unobserved characteristics of the products that a⁄ect the probability of exit. See Appendix B
for explanation.
7::::::+ ￿ Xckt0+ ￿c +yto+ "ckt0) (3)
k = 1;::; N
where Fin_Libc is an indicator variable for the o¢ cial date of equity liberalization, ￿rst sign
of liberalization or liberalization intensity. distanceck is a distance to comparative advantage
of product k in country c: ￿c is the country ￿xed e⁄ect. yto is the time ￿xed e⁄ect, where
the time dummy is taken at the beginning of the spell, "ck is an unobserved e⁄ect. All
explanatory variables are measured at the beginning of the trade relationship, except the
￿nancial liberalization dummy which takes value 1 if ￿nancial liberalization occurs before
the initiation of a spell or during the life of a spell.
The vector of Xck is a vector of controls, which includes the value in logarithm of export in
the ￿rst year of exporting, log(initial_exportck), re￿ ecting the degree of con￿dence between
partners at the initiation of the trade relationship. I account for the market size for product
k, incorporating the number of countries exporting product k at the initial year of a trade
relationship, NSuppliersk. I control for the previous experience of the exporters including
total years of exporting before current spell, tot_y_expck
10. Finally, I include a total number
of spells before the current t npellck, to control for previous failures.
In addition, I control for the trade openness at the beginning of the spell using the
respective variable from the Penn World Tables. I include GDPpc and its interaction term
with the measure of distance to comparative advantage to check that my results are not
driven by overall development of liberalized countries. I add several proxies for the banking
sector and stock market development from the database of Levin et al. (2009) to control for
the initial level of ￿nancial development in the liberalized countries. In all cases I allow for
a di⁄erentiated e⁄ect of these variables across products by including their interactions with
the distance measures.
To further check my results, I reestimate the baseline speci￿cation using two de facto
measures of ￿nancial liberalization.
hk(tjXck) = h0k(t)exp(￿:(Fin_Openct0￿distanceckt) +::
+::: ￿ Xckt0+ ￿c +yto+ "ckt0) (4)
k = 1;::; N
where the variable the Fin_Open denotes either Quinn Toyoda￿ s index of capital account
openness or Lane and Milesi-Ferretti￿ s ￿nancial openness measure.
Since ￿nancial liberalization varies across time and countries, I report robust clustered
standard errors where clustering is done at country x time level. In addition, I follow Cameron
et al. (2006), and compute two-way clustered standard errors along country and time dimen-
sion.11
10Recent exporting experience I de￿ne as a length of the previous spells ended less than 5 years before
beginning of the current spell (tot_y_exp).
11This is done by estimating 3 one-way cluster robust ￿variance ￿ matrices using standard Stata routine, for
one way clustering along three dimensions: the exporting country, the time and their intersection (exporting
country x time). The robust two-way clustered variance matrix is then obtained by adding the ￿rst two
variance matrices and subtracting the third. The results obtained using this procedure are similar to those
obtained using one-way clusterring. The result for the baseline estimation for the CPH model with two way
clusterred standard errors is presented in Appenidix H.
8I control for simultaneous banking and currency crisis by including respective dummies
in the baseline speci￿cation. The dates for banking are taken from the paper of Laeven and
Valencia (2008). Also, I control for simultaneous trade reform including a trade liberalization
dummy into the set of controls. I de￿ne the trade liberalization dummy in a similar manner
as the equity liberalization dummy. It takes the value 1 for all spells ended after the trade
liberalization date de￿ned by Wacziarg and Welch (2008).
In addition, I estimate the ￿xed e⁄ect logit regression model.
Pr(exit) = ￿:Fin_Libct￿distanceckt+￿Xckt+￿kc + yt+"ckt (5)
Pr(entry) = ￿:Fin_Libct￿distanceckt+￿Xckt+￿kc + yt+"ckt (6)
The logit regression provides a robustness check for the results obtained using the cox
regression as well as an additional test of the hypothesis. In particular, I test that ￿nancial
liberalization is associated with a relatively smaller number of entries in the comparative-
disadvantage sectors. Also, I trace the dynamic e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization on probability
of exits and entries introducing post liberalization dummies into the set of regressors. The
postliberalization dummies are set to be equal to 1 after 5 or 10 years of ￿nancial liberal-
ization. If the e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization diminishes with time, the coe¢ cients of the
postliberalization dummies must have opposite sign and be statistically signi￿cant, since
the long run e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization is obtained by summing up the coe¢ cients of
liberalization and postliberalization dummies.
Finally, I introduce the measure of overall e¢ ciency of the country￿ s export portfolio by
calculating the weighted sum of the distances of individual product categories. For each





(distanceckt ￿ Exptckt=Exptct) (7)
where Exptckt=Exptct is the share of product k in total export in year t and distanceck is the
distance measure de￿ned as in (1). A large value of this variable re￿ ects higher ine¢ ciency of
the country￿ s export pattern, the larger share of the country￿ s export contains the products
incompatible with the country￿ s factor endowments.12
I regress the average distance of the country￿ s export on the liberalization dummy and
other country characteristics which allows me to identify the impact of ￿nancial liberalization
on the overall e¢ ciency of the country￿ s export portfolio.
Distance_Exportct = ￿:Fin_Libct+ ￿Xct+ ￿c +yt+ "ct (8)
12There may be an endogeneity problem arising from having product export share in the individual distances
and in the weights used to compute this measure. To mitigate it, I recompute product factor intensities for
each country excluding the country in question from the sample of countries that is used to compute product
factor intensities. I obtain qualitatively similar results. Results are presented in Appendix G.
93 Estimation results
3.1 Baseline Speci￿cation
Table 1 presents the results for the baseline speci￿cation using the euclidean distance to
the comparative advantage (distanceckt) measure and various proxies for equity market lib-
eralization. The ￿rst three columns report the results obtained on the full sample of the
countries, including countries that have never liberalized the stock market, countries that
liberalized the stock markets during the period 1980-2000 and countries that liberalized the
stock market prior to 1980.13 The last three columns report the results obtained on the
restricted sample of the countries that liberalized the stock market during the period 1980-
2000. The ￿rst and forth columns display the results using the o¢ cial equity liberalization
dummy (Lib1ct). Lib1ct takes a value 0 if equity market liberalization happens before the
end of spell and 1 if equity market liberalization happens during the life of the spell or be-
fore the beginning of the spell. The second and ￿fth columns present the results for equity
liberalization intensity (Lib2ct) whose values indicate the share domestic equity available for
foreign investors, taking value 1 if foreign investors do not have any restriction in buying
domestic securities. The results for the last proxy of equity liberalization (Lib3) are reported
in columns three and six. The last proxy of equity market liberalization takes value 0, 1, or
2 depending on whether equity market liberalization happens after the end, during or before
the start of the spell.
The results seem to be robust to di⁄erent de￿nitions of equity liberalization. The eq-
uity market liberalization variables have negative and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients in-
dicating increase in the overall duration of the spells following equity liberalization. The
interaction terms of the equity market liberalization variables and the distance measure have
positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cients, implying that ￿nancial liberalization increases the like-
lihood of exits for the products inconsistent with a country￿ s factor endowments. Distance
to comparative advantage has a positive and statistically signi￿cant impact on the hazard
function, meaning that the products using intensively scarce resources have a relatively lower
survival rate14.
The classical determinants of the trade survival have the expected sign and are almost
always statistically signi￿cant. The initial product export and number of suppliers, which
capture the size and the structure of the product market, increase the duration of the spell
or, equivalently, decrease the hazard rate. Previous exporting experience (tot_y_exp) has a
negative and signi￿cant impact on the hazard rate. The number of previous spells (nspellckt)
impacts positively the hazard rate, implying that the previous exits make subsequent exits
more likely.
The results remain qualitatively unchanged on the restricted sample of countries liberal-
ized during the period 1980-2000 (columns 4 to 6).The coe¢ cients of liberalization variables
are negative and signi￿cant at 1% suggesting that following ￿nancial liberalization the sur-
vival of trade relationships increases. These results are in line with the empirical analysis
of Manova (2008) who documents an increase in the export volume following equity mar-
13In fact, I use the date of stock market liberalization as a proxy for capital account liberalization. According
to Henry (2003), stock market liberalization signi￿es the beginning of a steady move toward greater freedom
of capital in￿ows.
14The coe¢ cient of ￿nancial liberalization dummy for the liberalized countries sample is around 1.5, the
coe¢ cient of the interaction term is around 0.14. The Euclidian distance measure varies from [0.018; 7.6]. The
term (-1.5Lib+0.14*Lib*distance) is always negative for the range of the distance in my sample. Nevertheless,
the di⁄erence between hazard rates increases following ￿nancial liberalization. That is for two products with
the distance to CA 0.018 and 7.6, the relative hazard rate will increase by 300% .
Haz_rate(7.6)/Haz_rate(0.018)=EXP(0.14*(7.6-0.018))=2.89
10ket liberalization. An increase in the supply of ￿nance in the economy allows producers to
enter into new trade relationships, to survive longer and to expand existing ones. A better
performance in the intensive and the extensive margins translates into higher export growth
following ￿nancial liberalization.
The distance to comparative advantage measure and its interaction term with the liber-
alization dummies have positive and signi￿cant e⁄ects on the hazard rate of the trade rela-
tionships. Thus, the products incompatible with a country￿ s factor endowments disappear
at a faster rate from its export portfolio and even more so following ￿nancial liberalization.
This result suggests that ￿nancial liberalization has a di⁄erentiated e⁄ect across products,
pushing out products incompatible with a country￿ s resource endowments. The other ex-
planatory variables have the expected sign and are statistically signi￿cant in the reduced
sample. Comparing the results obtained in the reduced sample with those obtained in the
full sample, I can conclude that my results are not driven by di⁄erences between ￿nancially
open and closed countries.
Additionally, I reestimate the baseline speci￿cation using various de facto measures of
￿nancial liberalization, an alternative measure of distance (abs_distanceckt) and di⁄erent
strata variables. The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained in the baseline spec-
i￿cation.15 I also experiment with the two-way clustering using the procedure outlined in
Cameron et al. (2006). The signi￿cance of main variables of interests remains after account-
ing for two-way clustering. The results of this exercise is presented in Appendix H.
15See Appendix F for the results of the baseline estimation with alternative proxies for ￿nancial liberaliza-
tion and the distance to comparative advantage measure.
11.
Table 1: Baseline, Di⁄erent Proxies for Liberalization
The dependent variable is the hazard rate of an export relationship of product k from country c. All
regressions are estimated using the strati￿ed Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Cox 1972), with SITC
product code de￿ning a strati￿cation variable, controlling for country and time ￿xed e⁄ects. Robust
standard errors clustered at (exporting country)*time level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical signi￿cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lib1c -0.918*** -1.537***
(0.037) (0.050)
distanceckx Lib1c 0.111*** 0.149***
(0.016) (0.020)
distanceck 0.098*** 0.096*** 0.098*** 0.0226* 0.044*** 0.036**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
initial_exportck -0.062*** -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.059*** -0.064*** -0.061***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
NSuppliersck -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.009*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
tot_y_expck -0.159*** -0.167*** -0.166*** -0.152*** -0.175*** -0.165***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
product_exportk -0.043*** -0.052*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.044*** -0.057***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
nspellck 0.265*** 0.279*** 0.280*** 0.252*** 0.313*** 0.290***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Lib2c -1.789*** -2.470***
(0.084) (0.136)




distanceckx Lib3c 0.060*** 0.086***
(0.010) (0.015)
Sample All All All Lib Lib Lib
Observations 187619 187619 187619 88758 88758 88758
12Table 2 presents the results of the baseline speci￿cation with additional controls. The
￿rst ￿ve columns present the results for the full sample of countries, while the last ￿ve report
the results obtained on the restricted sample of the countries that liberalized their ￿nancial
markets over the period 1980-2001.
Empirical studies on trade survival document a positive e⁄ect of country economic and ￿-
nancial development on trade survival. Additionally, there is a concern that the liberalization
dummy may partially account for the e⁄ect of overall economic and ￿nancial development.
In this case, the interaction term (Lib1c￿distanceck) might represent the impact of some un-
observable feature of rich or ￿nancially developed countries that prevents them from wasteful
resource allocation. Therefore, I include in the set of additional controls the proxies for coun-
try economic development (GDPpc), country ￿nancial development (ratio of private credit
to GDP, the ratio stock market capitalization) and their interaction terms with the distance
measure.
Columns (1) and (6) present the results controlling for country economic development
(GDPpc) and its interaction term with the distance measure; columns (2) and (7) present the
results accounting for country banking development (ratio of private credit to GDP) and its
interaction term with the distance measure; columns (3) and (8) display the results including
country stock market development and its interaction term with the distance measure in the
set of controls.
The coe¢ cients of the main variables of interest keep the expected sign and remain
statistically signi￿cant. Financial liberalization is negative and signi￿cant suggesting an
increase in the duration of a country￿ s export after opening ￿nancial markets. The sign
and signi￿cance of the interaction terms of ￿nancial liberalization and the distance measure
imply that products incompatible with a country￿ s factor endowments have a relatively higher
hazard rate following ￿nancial liberalization. The coe¢ cient of the distance measure con￿rms
that products incompatible with a country￿ s factor endowments have a shorter survival. All
traditional controls maintain the expected sign and signi￿cance level in all speci￿cations.
The coe¢ cient of GDPpc is positive and signi￿cant in all regressions except those which
include stock market development in the set of controls. Notice that these results are obtained
including country ￿xed e⁄ects. The positive estimated coe¢ cient for GDPpc may imply that
the trade relationships initiated at the peak of a business cycle have a higher probability to
fail (see Jaud et al., 2010).
The interaction term of GDPpc and the distance measure is negative and signi￿cant in the
full sample of countries (column 1) while positive and statistically signi￿cant in the reduced
sample (column 6).The positive sign of the interaction term of GDPpc and the distance
measure obtained in the full sample of countries implies that products incompatible with a
country factor endowments survive longer in the export portfolio of a high income country.
This counterintuitive result may be due to the presence of outliers in the full sample. In the
reduced sample of countries, the sign of the coe¢ cient of the interaction term of GDPpc and
the distance measure suggests that products inconsistent with the factor endowments survive
less in the exporting portfolio of developed countries.
The coe¢ cients of the interaction term of the country￿ s private credit to GDP with the
product distance are positive and signi￿cant in both samples (column 2 and 7) con￿rming
the ￿nding of Jaud et al.(2010) who document that a well functioning bank sector promotes
the exporting pattern consistent with a country￿ s comparative advantage. The coe¢ cient of
bank sector development is positive and insigni￿cant in the full sample of countries while
negative and 10% statistically signi￿cant in the reduced sample of countries. The result for
the reduced sample is more intuitive as it suggests that countries with a better functioning
banking sector have higher duration of exports.
The coe¢ cient of the interaction of stock market development and the distance measure
13is positive but fails to be signi￿cant for both samples (columns 3 and 8). This result is in line
with the results of Jaud et al. (2010) who also do not ￿nd the robust results for the stock
market development. The coe¢ cient of stock market development alone is positive in both
samples but statistically signi￿cant only in the full sample of countries.
Exposure to international competition has a positive impact on export performance of
countries in the long run. Increasing returns to scale in production can reinforce the advantage
of operating at higher output levels due to exporting and can lead to further cumulative
gains in export market share. Importing intermediate and capital goods decreases the cost
of domestic production and gives access to superior technology. More importantly, exposure
to international competition could promote a more e¢ cient exporting pattern, eliminating
the ine¢ cient products or producers from a country￿ s export portfolio. Therefore, I include
the ratio of total export and import over GDP (Opencc) and its interaction term with the
distance measure in the baseline speci￿cation (columns 4 and 9).
As before the main variables of interest as well as traditional controls remain robust to
inclusion trade openness and its interaction term in the regression. Trade openness and its
interaction term are signi￿cant only in the reduced sample. The sign of the coe¢ cient of the
interaction term of trade openness with the distance suggests that the exposure to interna-
tional competition eliminates the product inconsistent with a country￿ s resource endowments.
The coe¢ cient of trade openness con￿rms that more trading increases the duration of a coun-
try exports.
Finally, empirical literature shows a bene￿cial e⁄ect of the equity market liberalization on
the industries depending on external ￿nance (Manova, 2008; Gupta et al., 2008). To ensure
that the main interaction term does not capture the e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization on
￿nancially dependent industries, I include the interaction term between the external ￿nance
dependence measure of Rajan and Zingales16 and the ￿nancial liberalization dummy (ExFj ￿
Lib1c) in the set of regressors (columns 5 and 10).
The coe¢ cients of the main variables of interest, as well as the traditional spell char-
acteristics, are similar to those obtained in the baseline regression. Financial liberalization
increases the overall survival of a country￿ s export but decreases the survival of the prod-
ucts inconsistent with a country￿ s factor endowments. The products incompatible with a
country￿ s factor endowments have a higher hazard rate. Consistent with the intuition under-
lined above, the interaction term of the external ￿nance dependence with the liberalization
dummy is negative and signi￿cant implying that ￿nancial liberalization increases the average
duration of the products of those industries.
16This measure is reported for the isic3 digit industry classi￿cation. I concorde it to the SITC product
classi￿cation.
14Table 2: Baseline, More Controls, All countries
The dependent variable is the hazard rate of an export relationship of product k from country c. All regres-
sions are estimated using the strati￿ed Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Cox 1972), with SITC product
code de￿ning a strati￿cation variable, controlling for country and time ￿xed e⁄ects.Robust standard errors
clustered at (exporting country)*time level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical signi￿cance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lib1c -0.967*** -0.943*** -1.324*** -0.948*** -0.994***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.051) (0.039) (0.036)
distanceckx Lib1c 0.125*** 0.097*** 0.077*** 0.112*** 0.128***
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
distanceck 0.261*** 0.070*** 0.049*** 0.089*** 0.086***
(0.055) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.007)
initial_exportck -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.062*** -0.065***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
NSuppliersck -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
tot_y_expck -0.163*** -0.165*** -0.163*** -0.163*** -0.062***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
product_exportk -0.037*** -0.0350*** -0.054*** -0.037***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
nspellck 0.269*** 0.274*** 0.285*** 0.269***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
GDPpc 0.357*** 0.327*** -0.184** 0.327*** 0.333***



















Sample All All All All All
Observations 179265 162389 81258 179265 169324
15Table 2: Baseline, More Controls, Liberalized
The dependent variable is the hazard rate of an export relationship of product k from country c. All regres-
sions are estimated using the strati￿ed Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Cox 1972), with SITC product
code de￿ning a strati￿cation variable, controlling for country and time ￿xed e⁄ects.Robust standard errors
clustered at (exporting country)*time level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical signi￿cance
at
VARIABLES (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lib1c -1.532*** -1.504*** -1.392*** -1.536*** -1.702***
(0.051) (0.054) (0.054) (0.051) (0.049)
distanceckx Lib1c 0.141*** 0.147*** 0.083*** 0.144*** 0.138***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
distanceck -0.241*** -0.033* 0.028* -0.007 0.027**
(0.089) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012)
initial_exportck -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.062*** -0.059*** -0.063***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
NSuppliersck -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
tot_y_expck -0.153*** -0.155*** -0.167*** -0.153*** -0.056***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
product_exportk -0.044*** -0.041*** -0.047*** -0.043*** -0.032***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
nspellkk 0.251*** 0.256*** 0.284*** 0.252*** 0.092***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003)
GDPpc 0.153* 0.306*** -0.196** 0.206*** 0.015



















Sample Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib
Observations 88758 80247 68421 88758 73758
163.2 Robustness Checks
Financial liberalization may coincide with trade reforms or may cause banking and currency
crisis. I control for a simultaneous trade reform, including a trade liberalization dummy and
its interaction with the distance measures in the main speci￿cation. To disentangle the e⁄ect
of ￿nancial liberalization from the e⁄ect of banking or currency crisis, I introduce banking
and currency crisis dummies and their interactions in the baseline speci￿cation. I assume
that a typical banking or currency crisis lasts one year. Therefore, the crisis dummy equals
to one only in the year of the occurrence of the crisis.17 The results are presented in Table 3.
Columns (1) and (4) present the results for the regressions with trade liberalization dummy,
columns (2) and (5) report the results for banking crisis and, columns (3) and (6) show results
with the currency crisis dummy.
The coe¢ cients of equity market liberalization and its interaction with distance have
the expected sign and are statistically signi￿cant in all columns. As before, traditional
controls maintain their expected sign and are highly statistically signi￿cant. The coe¢ cients
of the trade liberalization dummy are negative and signi￿cant, implying that following trade
liberalization the overall survival of products increases. The coe¢ cient of the interaction
term of trade liberalization with the distance measure varies across sub samples. In the full
sample of the countries it is positive and signi￿cant at 1% implying that trade liberalization
decreases survival of the products incompatible with the resource endowments.18 In the
sample of countries that liberalized their capital account over the period 1980-2001, the
coe¢ cient of the interaction term is negative and signi￿cant at 10%, implying that trade
liberalization increases the duration of products incompatible with the resource endowments
of the countries.
The coe¢ cient of the banking crisis dummy is positive implying that a banking crisis
decreases the duration of a country￿ s exports. These results are consistent with the recent
empirical evidence on banking crises and trade (Iacovone et al. 2009, Beverelli et al. 2010).
The interaction term of the distance measure with the banking crisis dummy is negative
implying that a banking crisis does not clean out the sectors incompatible with a country￿ s
factor endowments. Both the banking crisis dummy and its interaction term are statistically
signi￿cant only in the full sample of countries.
Currency crisis does not have a robust e⁄ect across di⁄erent samples. It is negative and
signi￿cant in the restricted sample of countries, implying that a devaluation of the domestic
currency increases the survival of a country￿ s exports. It is positive but insigni￿cant in the
full sample of countries. The e⁄ect of the interaction term of the distance measure and the
currency crisis dummy also varies across the samples. It is negative and signi￿cant in the
full sample and positive, but not signi￿cant in the restricted sample. The result obtained
using the full sample of countries implies that a currency crisis increases the survival of the
economy￿ s ine¢ cient sectors. This may capture a procompetitive e⁄ect of the devaluation of
domestic currency on exports.
My results may be driven by the presence of long spells in my sample. I address this
issue by reestimating the baseline model in two di⁄erent sub samples of the countries that
17I use Stata command stsplit to split the original trade spells into 3 parts before the crisis, during the
time of crisis and after the crisis. This procedure is commonly used in survival analysis when there is a need
to introduce time varying covariates in estimations. Results remain qualitatively the same if I assume that
the crisis lasts two years instead of one.
18This result is in line with the theoretical model of Bernard et al.(2007). They show that following trade
liberalization, the comparative disadvantage industries experience a net ￿rms destruction while comparative
advantage industries experience a net ￿rms creation. This translates into an increase in the survival of
products in comparative advantage industries and a decrease in the survival of products in comparative
disadvantage industries.
17liberalize their equity market during 1980-2001. The ￿rst one restricts the spells to those
initiated in the 10 years interval of ￿nancial liberalization. The second contains only the
spells that ended before or started after ￿nancial liberalization. The results of this exercise
are presented in Table 4.
The ￿nancial liberalization dummy and the interaction term of ￿nancial liberalization
dummy with the distance maintain positive and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients in both
sub samples, indicating that my results are not driven by the prevalence of long spells. The
distance measure remains positive in both subsamples but fails to be signi￿cant in the second
subsample. The classical determinants of trade survival (e.g. Nsuppliers, initial_export,
tot_y_exp, nspell) keep the expected signs and signi￿cance level.
18Table 3: Banking and Currency Crisis, Trade Liberalization
The dependent variable is the hazard rate of an export relationship of product k from country c. All re-
gressions are estimated using the strati￿ed Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Cox 1972) with SITC product
code de￿ning a strati￿cation variable, controlling for country and time ￿xed e⁄ects. The baseline speci-
￿cation is de￿ned in Table 1. Robust standard errors clustered at (exporting country)*time level are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical signi￿cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lib1c -0.805*** -0.924*** -0.908*** -1.479*** -1.541*** -1.531***
(0.041) (0.037) (0.037) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050)
distanceckx Lib1c 0.086*** 0.115*** 0.104*** 0.149*** 0.151*** 0.141***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
distanceck 0.083*** 0.098*** 0.111*** 0.026* 0.023* 0.025
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016)
initial_exportck -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.0586***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
NSuppliersck -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
tot_y_expck -0.156*** -0.159*** -0.159*** -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.153***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
product_exportk -0.038*** -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.045*** -0.047***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
nspellck 0.254*** 0.265*** 0.265*** 0.245*** 0.252*** 0.252***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
TLc -0.550*** -0.398***
(0.032) (0.046)








distanceckx CCc -0.035*** 0.007
(0.013) (0.02)
Sample Full Full Full Lib Lib Lib
Observations 187619 187619 187619 88758 88758 88758
19Table 4: Di⁄erent subsamples
The dependent variable is the hazard rate of an export relationship
of product k from country c. All regressions are estimated using
the strati￿ed Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Cox 1972) with
SITC product code de￿ning a strati￿cation variable, controlling
for country and time ￿xed e⁄ects. The baseline speci￿cation is
de￿ned in Table 1. Robust standard errors clustered at (exporting
country)*time level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote




















3.3 Entry and Exit Behaviour
In this section I estimate the e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization on the probability to exit from
and to entry into the exporting activity (see equation 5, 6). Whenever possible, I keep the
same set of explanatory variables as in the Cox regression. In order to save the space I report
the results for the reduced sample only.19
Table 5 presents the results for the regression where the dependent variable is a probability
of exit from the exporting activity. Column (1) reports the result including GDPpc and its
interaction term with the distance measure to the set of explanatory variables. Column (2)
reports the result controlling for banking sector development and its interaction term with
the distance measure. Column (3) accounts for stock market development and allows stock
market development to have di⁄erentiated e⁄ect across product categories. Finally column
(4) reports the results accounting for initial trade openness.
The results for the logit regression for the probability of exit is consistent with the results
obtained previously (see Table 2). The liberalization dummy enters the regression negatively
19The results for the full sample are qualitatively similar and available upon request.
20and signi￿cantly, implying that ￿nancial liberalization decreases the probability of exit of the
country￿ s export. The interaction term of the ￿nancial liberalization dummy and the distance
measure is positive and signi￿cant supporting the main hypothesis. Distance to comparative
advantage is most of the time positive and highly signi￿cant, meaning that products incon-
sistent with a country￿ s factor endowments have a higher propensity to exit from a country￿ s
export portfolio. All traditional controls have the expected signs and are highly signi￿cant
(NSuppliersck;tot_y_expck;product_exportk). Interestingly, the coe¢ cient of GDPpc is
negative and signi￿cant at 1% which is in contrast with the results of the Cox regressions but
which is more intuitive. The interaction term of the ratio of the country￿ s GDPpc with the
distance measure is positive and signi￿cant as before implying a higher probability of exit
of the comparative disadvantage products from the export portfolio of developed countries
(column 1).
The coe¢ cients of bank development is positive but not signi￿cant, which may be due to
the presence of GDPpc in the regression. The interaction term of the ratio of private credit
to GDP with the distance measure con￿rms the results obtained using the Cox regression.
The coe¢ cients of stock market and bank development are not signi￿cant, which may
be due to the presence of GDPpc in the regression. Its interaction term of stock market
capitalization with the distance measure while positive fails to enters signi￿cantly in the
regressions (column 3)
Trade openness is negative and signi￿cant implying that trade relationships emanated
from a country that is more opened to trade survive longer. The sign of the interaction term
of trade openness with the distance measure suggests that more trading helps to eliminate
products incompatible with a country factor endowments.
Table 6 reports the results associated with the probability of entry to the exporting
activity. As in Table 5, column (1) reports results controlling for an exporting country￿ s
economic development and its interaction term with the distance. Column (2) and (3) report
the results when bank and stock market development, and their interactions with the distance
measure are included in the set of controls. The last column reports the result controlling
for a country￿ s trade openness.
The ￿nancial liberalization dummy is always positive and signi￿cant re￿ ecting an increase
in entries following ￿nancial liberalization. The interaction term of the ￿nancial liberalization
dummy and the distance measure is negative and signi￿cant at 5% in all speci￿cations, mean-
ing that products inconsistent with a country￿ s comparative advantage have lower chances to
be exported after ￿nancial liberalization. The coe¢ cients of trade openness, GDPpc, bank
and stock market development are positive and statistically signi￿cant. In other words,
higher level of economic development, better functioning ￿nancial markets and trade open-
ness are associated with a higher number of entries in the exporting activity.
The interaction terms of these variable with distance measure are negative and statistically
signi￿cant. Therefore, better functioning ￿nancial markets and institutions, trade openness
not only pushes out ine¢ cient exporters but also prevents from them starting to export.
Table 7 reports the results including postliberalization dummies and their interaction
with the distance measure in the vector of explanatory variables. I set the postliberalization
dummies equal to one after ￿ve or ten years of ￿nancial liberalization, and zero otherwise.
These additional dummies allow to distinguish between short- and long-run e⁄ects of ￿nancial
liberalization on the probability of exit. The long-run e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization is
estimated by summing the coe¢ cients of post liberalization and liberalization dummies. If
the e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization is temporary, the coe¢ cients of the postliberalization and
liberalization dummies should have the opposite sign and be both signi￿cant to cancel the
e⁄ect of each other. Columns (1)-(3) report the results for the logit regression when the
dependent variable is the probability of exit, while columns (4)-(6) display the results for the
21regression when the dependent variable is a probability of entry.
The results of the logit regression for the probability of exit are in line with the results pre-
viously reported. The liberalization dummy is negative and signi￿cant implying that ￿nancial
liberalization decreases the probability of exiting from the exporting activity. Distance to
comparative advantage is positive and highly signi￿cant implying that products inconsistent
with a country￿ s factor endowments have a higher propensity to exit from a country￿ s export
portfolio.
Both the postliberalization and the liberalization dummies are negative, however only the
liberalization dummy is signi￿cant, suggesting that the e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization on the
probability of exit is permanent. The interaction terms of the postliberalization dummies with
the distance measure are positive but insigni￿cant, while the main interaction term remains
signi￿cant and positive. These results suggest that the e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization on the
probability of exit holds after ￿ve or ten years of ￿nancial liberalization.
The results of the regressions for the probability of entry (columns 4-6) reinforce the results
previously obtained. The interaction term of the ￿nancial liberalization dummy and the
distance measure remain negative and signi￿cant after the inclusion of the postliberalization
dummies and their interactions with the distance in the regression. The postliberalization
dummies and their interaction terms are not statistically signi￿cant implying that the e⁄ect
of ￿nancial liberalization remains signi￿cant after 5 and 10 years.
22Table 5: Fixed E⁄ect Logit Regression 1971-2003,
More Controls, Pr(exit)
The dependent variable is the probability of ending of an export relationship of
product k from country c. All regressions are estimated using the ￿xed e⁄ect logit
regression controlling for time ￿xed e⁄ects. Robust bootstrapped standard errors
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical signi￿cance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lib1c -0.300*** -0.195*** -0.183*** -0.291***
(0.0275) (0.029) (0.035) (0.027)
distanceckx Lib1c 0.135*** 0.082*** 0.038* 0.124***
(0.0155) (0.018) (0.022) (0.015)
distanceck -0.0953 0.190*** 0.221*** 0.150***
(0.142) (0.022) (0.023) (0.027)
NSuppliersck -0.0473*** -0.048*** -0.054*** -0.048***
(0.000607) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
tot_y_expck -0.0283*** -0.029*** -0.034*** -0.029***
(0.00199) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
product_exportk -0.0907*** -0.081*** -0.095*** -0.089***
(0.00942) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009)
GDPpc -0.580*** -0.562*** -0.882*** -0.396***















Sample Lib Lib Lib Lib
Observations 499985 431391 332590 499985
Number of index 28982 26877 23759 28982
23Table 6: Fixed E⁄ect Logit Regression 1971-2003
More Controls, Pr(entry)
The dependent variable is the probability of starting of a new export relationship
for product k from country c. All regressions are estimated using the ￿xed e⁄ect
logit regression controlling for time ￿xed e⁄ects. Robust bootstrapped standard
errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical signi￿cance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lib1c 0.325*** 0.239*** 0.225*** 0.293***
(0.0268) (0.0292) (0.0336) (0.0263)
distanceckxLib1c -0.168*** -0.109*** -0.0440** -0.145***
(0.0142) (0.0163) (0.0211) (0.0137)
distanceck 0.520*** 0.0138 -0.0987*** 0.104***
(0.156) (0.0210) (0.0226) (0.0269)
NSuppliersck 0.0383*** 0.0387*** 0.0428*** 0.0386***
(0.000606) (0.000656) (0.000816) (0.000606)
tot_y_expck 0.0390*** 0.0490*** 0.0828*** 0.0393***
(0.00238) (0.00265) (0.00369) (0.00238)
product_exportk 0.112*** 0.0959*** 0.0980*** 0.111***
(0.00806) (0.00873) (0.0107) (0.00806)
GDPpc 0.333*** 0.173*** 0.418*** 0.167***















Sample Lib Lib Lib Lib
Observations 484655 414080 284687 484655
Number of index 29453 27474 24691 29453
24Table 7: Fixed E⁄ect Logit Regression,1971-2003
The dependent variable is the probability of ending of (columns 1 & 2)or entering
into (columns 3 &4) an export relationship of product k from country c. All
regressions are estimated using the ￿xed e⁄ect logit regression controlling for time
￿xed e⁄ects. Robust bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and
*** denote statistical signi￿cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Pr(exit) Pr(exit) Pr(entry) Pr(entry)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lib1c -0.211*** -0.231*** 0.371*** 0.355***
(0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.025)
distanceckxLib1c 0.029** 0.027*** -0.115*** -0.109***





distanceck 0.181*** 0.179*** -0.078*** -0.078***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
NSuppliersck -0.044*** -0.044*** 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
tot_y_expck -0.151*** -0.149*** 0.015*** 0.015**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
product_exportk -0.089*** -0.088*** 0.117*** 0.117***





Observations 602408 602408 598068 598068
Sample Lib Lib Lib Lib
Number of index 31122 31122 32113 32113
3.4 An Aggregate Proxy for Allocative E¢ ciency
Another way to visualize the e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization on a country￿ s export pattern is
to consider what happens with the overall distance of the country￿ s exports to the country￿ s
comparative advantage set around the liberalization episode. I run the ￿xed e⁄ect regression
of the average distance of the country￿ s exports on three liberalization dummies controlling
for the exporting country￿ s level of economic development (GDPpc), its quality of ￿nancial
system (private credit to GDP), trade openness and year e⁄ects.
The results are reported in Table 8. The liberalization dummy is negative but signi￿cant
only when I include a postliberalization dummy (PostLib10) in the set of controls. The
postliberalization dummies are negative and signi￿cant suggesting that the e⁄ect of ￿nancial
liberalization can be visualized only with time. Trade openness is negative and signi￿cant
in all cases implying that international competition in the product market helps countries to
rebalance their export portfolio in line with their factors endowment. Private credit of the
banks to GDP, although negative, fails to be signi￿cant in all regressions. GDPpc is positive
but insigni￿cant in all speci￿cation.
Overall, the results con￿rm the results obtained using the Cox and the logit models and
25suggest that ￿nancial liberalization reduces the overall ine¢ ciency of a country￿ s exports by
sweeping out the products incompatible with its resource endowments.
Table 8: Distance to CA and
Financial Liberalization
The dependent variable is a overall distance to comparative ad-
vantage. The speci￿cation accounts for country and time ￿xed
e⁄ects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses *, **, and ***
denote statistical signi￿cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, re-
spectively.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)




Opencc -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDPpc 0.146 0.197 0.150
(0.358) (0.358) (0.351)




Constant 0.855 0.746 0.832
(0.746) (0.747) (0.733)
Observations 935 935 935
R2 0.831 0.832 0.833
Sample Lib. Lib Lib
3.5 Financial Liberalization, Financial Development and Quality of
Institutions
In this part, I empirically investigate the e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization on domestic ￿nancial
markets, legal institutions and overall business environment. As proxies for the quality of
domestic ￿nancial system, I use two standard proxies for stock market development (the ratio
of total value traded on the stock market exchange to GDP and the equity market turnover)
and two standard measures of banking sector development (the ratio of private credit of
deposit banks to GDP and the ratio of private credit of deposit banks and other ￿nancial
institutions to GDP). The data are taken from the database of Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and
Levine￿ s (2009), which reports various indicators of ￿nancial development across countries
and over time.
As proxies for the quality of domestic legal institutions and the intensity of government
regulation, I use the indices of Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights (LSPR) and
Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business (BCLR). These data are constructed by Gwartney
and Lawson and can be found in the Economic Freedom Database (EFD) 2008. The indices
are reported every ￿ve years from 1970 to 2005 for approximately 100 countries. The index
of Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights consists of 4 components that measure
26the judiciary independence from manipulation of the executive and legislative branches of
government, the impartiality of the court system, the potential danger of military interfer-
ence in rule of law and in the political process and the degree of protection of intellectual
property rights. The index of Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business encompasses var-
ious regulatory restraints that limit the freedom of exchange in credit, labor, and product
markets. The list of restrictions includes restrictions on ownership of banks, foreign bank
competition, private sector credit and interest rate controls for the credit market; minimum
wage requirements, hiring and ￿ring regulations, presence of centralized collective bargaining
for the labor market and price control, administrative requirements (GCR), licensing restric-
tions, bureaucratic costs for product market. The indices vary from 1 to 10, with higher
values indicating a better quality of the institutions in the country.
Given that the independent variables are very persistent, I include the lagged dependent
variable in each speci￿cation. I include time e⁄ects to potentially control for a general trend
towards ￿nancial and institutional development. For some of the variables, I have a limited
number of observations, so that the time e⁄ects exhaust many degrees of freedom. Therefore,
I run an alternative speci￿cation replacing the time dummies with world GDP growth. I run
regressions on the restricted sample of countries that liberalized equity market during the
period 1980-2000. Table 9 reports the results. The dependent variables are reported in the
￿rst column of the table. The coe¢ cients of ￿nancial liberalization are reported in columns
2 and 3.
Financial liberalization has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on the volume of credit of
deposit banks and on the stock market turnover Results hold in both speci￿cations, con-
trolling for world GDP growth or year dummies. Financial liberalization does not have a
robust e⁄ect on the other proxies of ￿nancial development. In one out of two speci￿cations
the ￿nancial liberalization dummy fails to be signi￿cant.
My results are in line with recent studies of Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2010) who
￿nd a signi￿cant relationship between stock market liberalization and ￿nancial development
(both banking and stock market development), but do not ￿nd evidence for the reverse
link (that is, ￿nancial development do not necessarily predict liberalization). Chinn and Ito
(2006) also show a link between broad capital market openness and measures of ￿nancial
development in a regression framework that is similar to my speci￿cation.
Financial liberalization has a bene￿cial e⁄ect on the business regulation proxied by the
Index of Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business.20 In both speci￿cations the coe¢ cient
of ￿nancial liberalization is positive and signi￿cant at 10%. Results are less robust for the
regression with index of Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights. When world growth
is used as a control, the ￿nancial liberalization dummy loses signi￿cance.
While not de￿nitive, my results suggest that ￿nancial liberalization may have some ben-
e￿cial e⁄ects on the quality of domestic ￿nancial markets and legal institutions which are
responsible for the allocation of resources in an economy.
20I have a panel with a 5 year gap, in the best case I have only 7 observations per country.
27Table 9: Financial Liberalization and
Quality of Institutions
The dependent variables are reported in the Column 1 and in-
clude various proxies for ￿nancial and institutional development.
The regression is estimated using OLS including the lag dependent
variable in the set of controls. Robust standard errors clusterred
at country level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statis-
tical signi￿cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) Obs/Nmb of id
BkDc 0.015* 0.015** 1262/42
(0.013) (0.012)
BkDAc 0.015* 0.002 1272/42
(0.010) (0.003)
StValc 0.011 0.025** 903/42
(0.014) (0.012)
StTurnc 0.031** 0.032** 1537/42
(0.014) (0.013)
LSPRc 0.889*** 0.102 176/41
(0.336) (0.219)
BCLRc 0.259* 0.335*** 170/41
(0.143) (0.116)
Lag dependent variable YES YES
Time e⁄ect YES NO
World GDPpc growth NO YES
Sample Lib. Lib
284 Conclusion
According to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, countries should export products that use their
abundant and cheap factors of production and import products that utilize their scarce
factors. These predictions may not hold in the presence of credit market frictions or active
industrial policy of the government.
I ￿nd evidence that ￿nancial liberalization promotes more e¢ cient allocation of the re-
sources in the economy. I evaluate the impact of ￿nancial liberalization on the survival of
di⁄erent product categories using export data for 91 countries over the period 1975-2003. My
results suggest that following equity market liberalization, the products incompatible with
the country￿ s factor endowments exit more and enter less to the country￿ s export portfolio.
The results remain valid after accounting for various alternative channels.
Financial liberalization is often associated with macroeconomic volatility, ￿nancial bub-
bles and banking crisis. Nevertheless, I ￿nd that the overall distance of a country￿ s export
portfolio to comparative advantage decreases which implies a more e¢ cient exporting pat-
tern. Therefore, ￿nancial liberalization is associated with a more e¢ cient resources allocation
in the economy afterwards.
I provide some insights into the channels through which ￿nancial liberalization may im-
prove allocation e¢ ciency. Consistent with previous empirical studies (see for example,
Kaminksky and Schmukler, 2007; Bekaert et al., 2010), I ￿nd that ￿nancial liberalization
is associated with improvements in two main sources of long term economic growth: ￿nan-
cial development and institutional quality.
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32APPENDIX A: THE COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL
The duration of a country export for a given product is de￿ned as the time (measured in
years) when a trade relationship has been in existence without interruption. The distribution
of durations can be characterized in terms of the hazard function which is de￿ned as the
instantaneous probability that a trade relationship is ended at time t given that it survives
until time t-1.
h(t) = P(T = tjT ￿ t;x) t = 1;2;:::
The Cox Proportional Hazard model assumes that the hazard rate is the product of a un-
speci￿ed baseline hazard function, which depends only on time, and the exponential function
of the covariates.
h(t;x;￿) = h0(t)exp(x:￿)
This speci￿cation assumes that the covariates a⁄ect the hazard function independently on
time the trade relatinship exists, shifting by the same magnitude all points of a baseline
function. The coe¢ cients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities, as they measure the e⁄ect
of a change in the right-hand side variables on the log of the hazard rate.
Due to this structure, the Cox Proportional Hazard model is extremely versatile and can
￿t various models. The baseline hazard can vary across di⁄erent groups, called stratas, but
the vector of parameters is restricted to be the same.
hj(t;x;￿) = hj0(t)exp(x:￿)
Since the baseline hazard function remains unspeci￿ed, only the order of duration provides
information about the unknown parameters. The model is estimated by maximizing a partial
likelihood function with respect to the vector of parameters ￿ without specifying the form of
the baseline hazard function h0(t): The estimated parameters re￿ ect the relationship between
the explanatory variables and the hazard function (i.e. the risk for a trade relationship to
end).
There are several issues related to the duration analysis which need to be addressed.
First, observations may be right-censored. This is the case when trade relationships are still
in progress in the ￿nal year of the sample period. 22% of the observations are right cen-
sored. The Cox Proportional Hazard model can handle right censored observations. Second,
observations may be left censored, which means that we cannot determine the date when
they were initiated. In this situation, the actual length of the spells cannot be determined.
To mitigate this problem, I estimate the model dropping the left censored observations, that
is, the observations for which trade ￿ ows were recorded already in 1970. Such observations
represent around 10% of all observations. Third, some trade relationships may have several
periods of continuous exporting (spells). An exporter can enter the market, export for a
while, exit and re-enter again. Such consecutive exits may be interrelated. The ￿rst exit
may increase probability of the following exits. To account for this issue, I introduce a mul-
tiple spells dummy indicating the trade relationships with several spells. Around 6% of the
observations in my sample have multiple spells.
APPENDIX B: STRATA OR FIXED EFFECT.
In strati￿ed Cox model, the baseline hazard can vary across di⁄erent groups while the
coe¢ cient ￿x is constrained to be the same:
h(tjxj) = h01(t)exp(xj￿x)
if j is in group 1
33h(tjxj) = h02(t)exp(xj￿x)
if j is in group 2
Lets instead include dummy variable taking value 1 if the observation belongs to the ￿rst
group and 0 if it belongs to the second group to the set of regressors.
h(tjxj) = h0(t)exp(xj￿x + D)
This expression can be rewritten as :
h(tjxj) = h0(t)exp(D) ￿ exp(xj￿x)
Multiplicative term exp(D) takes value exp(1) if the observation belongs to the ￿rst group
and exp(0) if it is in the second group.
Which implies that baseline functions of two groups di⁄er by the factor of proportionality.
h(tjxj) = h0(t)exp(1) ￿ exp(xj￿x)
if j is in group 1
h(tjxj) = h0(t) ￿ exp(xj￿x)
if j is in group 2
The above expressions can be written as:
h(tjxj) = ~ h0j(t) ￿ exp(xj￿x)
j = 1;2
Strati￿cation allows the baseline functions of two groups to have di⁄erent shape. There-
fore, introducing ￿xed e⁄ect can be viewed as a particular case of strati￿cation where baseline
functions di⁄er across groups by the factor of proportionality.
APPENDIX C: COUNTRY COVERAGE
Liberalized during 1980-2000 (Restricted sample): Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Cote d￿ Ivoire, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Greece, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand,
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South
Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, and
Zimbabwe.
Liberlized prior to 1980: Australia, Austria, Barbados, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, United King-
dom, and United States
Remains closed until 2000:Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Re-
public, Chad, Congo, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Gam-
bia, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Nepal,
34Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Paraguay, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Syria, Togo, Uruguay,
and Zambia.
35APPENDIX D: DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES
Variable Description
Lib1c Lib1 =0 for all spells that ends before ￿nancial liberalization
and 1 otherwise
Lib2c Lib2 =0 for all spells that ends before ￿nancial liberalization
Lib2>0 re￿ects the proportion of equity available for foreign investors
Lib3c Lib3 =0 for all spells that ends before ￿nancial liberalization,
Lib3= 1 for all spells that started before and ended after liberalization
Lib3= 2 for all spells that started after ￿nancial liberalization
distanceckx Lib{1,2,3}c interaction term of the distance measure with the liberalization dummy
distanceck Euclidian distance of product k
initial_exportck Value of export at the initiation of a trade relationship
NSuppliersck Number of suppliers at the initiation the trade relationship
tot_y_expck Number of years of trading before the current spells.
product_exportk Total value of the product export to the World
nspellck Number of spells
GDPpc GDPpc of exporting country at the initiation the spell
distanceckxGDPpc Interaction term of GDPpc with the product distance measure
distanceckx BkDc Interaction term of private credit to GDP with the product distance measure
BkDc Private credit to GDP at the initiation of the spell
distanceck x StMc Interaction term of private credit to GDP with the product distance measure
StMc Stock market capitalization to GDP at the initiation of the spell
distanceck x Opencc Interaction term stock market capitalization to GDP
with the product distance measure
Opencc Trade opennenss of the country at the initiation of the spell,
the ratio of sum of total export and import to GDPpc
ExtFinDep x Lib1 Interaction term of External Finance Dependence measure
with the liberalization dummy
ExtFinDep External Finance Dependence measure
TLc Trade liberalization dummy
distanceck x TLc Interaction term of trade liberalization dummy
with the product distance measure
BCc Banking crisis dummy
distanceckx BCc Interaction term of banking crisis dummy with the product distance measure
CCc Currency crisis dummy
distanceckx CCc Interaction term of currencycrisis dummy
with the product distance measure
BkDAc Ratio of private credit of deposit banks and other ￿nancial institutions to GDP
StValc Ratio of total value traded on the stock market exchange to GDP
StTurnc Stock Market Turnover
LSPRc Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights Index
BCLRc Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business Index
36APPENDIX E: KAPLAN MEIER ESTIMATES OF SURVIVAL FUNCTIONS
(CONT.)
Below are the graphs of the Kaplan Meier estimates of survival functions for the products
that are below and above 25% and 75% percentile of the distance measure. It is visible
that survival of all products increases following liberalization. But the distance between the
survival functions of these two groups increases implying that the comparative disadvantage
products have shorter relative survival following ￿nancial liberalization.
Survival of the products following ￿nancial liberalization,
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37APPENDIX F: ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF DISTANCE, FINANCIAL
OPENNESS; DIFFERENT STRATIFICATION VARIABLE
Table A: Baseline Speci￿cation,Absolute Distance
The dependent variable is the hazard rate of an export relationship of product k from country c. All
regressions are estimated using the strati￿ed Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Cox 1972), with SITC
product code de￿ning a strati￿cation variable, controlling for country and time ￿xed e⁄ects. Robust
standard errors clustered at (exporting country)*time level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical signi￿cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lib1c -0.908*** -1.523***
(0.036) (0.049)
abs_distanceck x Lib1c 0.068*** 0.088***
(0.010) (0.012)
abs_distance 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.020*** 0.035*** 0.030***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
initial_exportck -0.062*** -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.059*** -0.064*** -0.061***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
NSuppliersck -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.009*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.000)) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
tot_y_expck -0.159*** -0.167*** -0.166*** -0.153*** -0.175*** -0.166***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
product_exportk -0.042*** -0.051*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.056***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
nspellck 0.265*** 0.279*** 0.280*** 0.252*** 0.312*** 0.289***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Lib2c -1.787*** -2.432***
(0.0842) (0.134)




abs_distanceck x Lib3c 0.036*** 0.051***
(0.006) (0.009)
Sample All All All Lib Lib Lib
Observations 187619 187619 187619 88758 88758 88758
38APPENDIX F: ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF DISTANCE, FINANCIAL
OPENNESS; DIFFERENT STRATIFICATION VARIABLE
Table B: Capital Account Openness, All countries
The dependent variable is the hazard rate of an export relationship of product
k from country c. All regressions are estimated using the strati￿ed Cox Propor-
tional Hazard Model (Cox 1972), with SITC product code de￿ning a strati￿cation
variable, controlling for country and time ￿xed e⁄ects. Robust standard errors
clustered at (exporting country)*time level are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
denote statistical signi￿cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.





distanceck 0.101*** 0.074*** -0.203*** 0.057***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.020) (0.013)
initial_exportck -0.066*** -0.057*** -0.059*** -0.067***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
NSuppliersck -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
tot_y_expck -0.179*** -0.136*** -0.129*** -0.179***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
product_exportk -0.046*** -0.034*** -0.029*** -0.045***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
nspellck 0.301*** 0.197*** 0.191*** 0.310***













Sample All All All All
Observations 175218 148111 124955 148564
39APPENDIX F: ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF DISTANCE, FINANCIAL
OPENNESS; DIFFERENT STRATIFICATION VARIABLE
Table B: Capital Account Openness, Liberalized
The dependent variable is the hazard rate of an export relationship of product
k from country c. All regressions are estimated using the strati￿ed Cox Propor-
tional Hazard Model (Cox 1972), with SITC product code de￿ning a strati￿cation
variable, controlling for country and time ￿xed e⁄ects. Robust standard errors
clustered at (exporting country)*time level are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
denote statistical signi￿cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.





distanceck 0.074*** 0.008 -0.331*** 0.060***
(0.023) (0.040) (0.038) (0.020)
initial_exportck -0.067*** -0.057*** -0.056*** -0.065***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
NSuppliersck -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
tot_y_expck -0.190*** -0.134*** -0.129*** -0.191***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
product_exportk -0.040*** -0.023*** -0.010 -0.037***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
nspellck 0.339*** 0.211*** 0.201*** 0.347***













Sample Lib Lib Lib Lib
Observations 88758 69706 61181 77752
40APPENDIX F: ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF DISTANCE, FINANCIAL
OPENNESS; DIFFERENT STRATIFICATION VARIABLE
Table C: Di⁄erent Stratas
The dependent variable is the hazard rate of an export relationship of product k from country c. All
regressions are estimated using the strati￿ed Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Cox 1972). Robust standard
errors clustered at (exporting country)*time level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistica
signi￿cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lib1c -0.918*** -0.951*** -0.944*** -1.537*** -1.613*** -1.376***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.044) (0.050) (0.057) (0.050)
distanceck x Lib1c 0.111*** 0.125*** 0.175*** 0.149*** 0.160*** 0.174***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023)
distanceck 0.098*** 0.101*** -0.067*** 0.023* 0.035** -0.056**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.022)
initial_exportck -0.062*** -0.065*** -0.057*** -0.059*** -0.063*** -0.059***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
NSuppliersck -0.006*** -0.011*** -0.004*** -0.010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
tot_y_expck -0.159*** -0.149*** 0.007** -0.152*** -0.153*** -0.007
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
product_exportk -0.043*** -0.081*** -0.045*** -0.082***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
nspellck 0.265*** 0.255*** 0.252*** 0.250***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Sample All All All Lib Lib Lib
Observations 187619 187619 187619 88758 88758 88758
41APPENDIX G: DISTANCE TO COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
To mitigate the endogeneity problem arising from having product export share in the
individual distances and in the weights used to compute this measure, I recompute product
factor intensities for each country excluding the country in question from the sample of coun-
tries that is used to compute product factor intensities. Therefore, product factor intensities
become product country and time varying. Results are presented below.
Table D: Distance to CA and
Financial Liberalization
The dependent variable is a overall distance to comparative ad-
vantage The baseline speci￿cation accounts for country and time
￿xed e⁄ects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses *, **, and
*** denote statistical signi￿cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)




Opencc -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDPpc 0.038 0.047 0.040
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043)




Constant 1.490*** 1.431*** 1.405***
(0.296) (0.295) (0.394)
Observations 931 931 931
Sample Lib. Lib Lib
R2 0.871 0.872 0.873
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
42APPENDIX H: TWO WAY CLUSTERING
I have experimented with the two-way clustering using the procedure suggested by Cameron
et al. (2006). The idea there is based on three variance matrices: ￿rst one is computed using
clustering according to country, second one is based on clustering according to time and third
one uses clustering alongside country*time dimension. The ￿nal variance matrix is the sum of
￿rst and second matrix, minus the third one. When resulting matrix is negative, I follow the
rule of thumb suggested by Cameron et al. (2006), the standard errors of the coe¢ cients are
maximum of standard errors computed by clusterring along each dimension (e.g. country,
year, country x time).The results of the baseline speci￿cation for the Cox Proportinal model
is presented below.
43.
Table E: Baseline, Di⁄erent Proxies for Liberalization,
2-way clustering
The dependent variable is the hazard rate of an export relationship of product k from country c. All
regressions are estimated using the strati￿ed Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Cox 1972), with SITC
product code de￿ning a strati￿cation variable, controlling for country and time ￿xed e⁄ects. Two way
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistica signi￿cance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lib1c -0.918*** -1.537***
(0.100) (0.14)
distanceckx Lib1c 0.111*** 0.149***
(0.027) (0.040)
distanceck 0.098*** 0.096*** 0.098*** 0.0226 0.044** 0.036**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.026) (0.017)
initial_exportck -0.062*** -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.059*** -0.064*** -0.061***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
NSuppliersck -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.009*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
tot_y_expck -0.159*** -0.167*** -0.166*** -0.152*** -0.175*** -0.165***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
product_exportk -0.043*** -0.052*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.044*** -0.057***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
nspellck 0.265*** 0.279*** 0.280*** 0.252*** 0.313*** 0.290***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Lib2c -1.789*** -2.470***
(0.110) (0.331)




distanceckx Lib3c 0.060*** 0.086***
(0.014) (0.02)
Sample All All All Lib Lib Lib
Observations 187619 187619 187619 88758 88758 88758
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